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Abstract
The advent of social media changed the way we consume content favoring a
disintermediated access and production. This scenario has been matter of critical
discussion about its impact on society. Magnified in the case of Arab Spring or heavily
criticized in the Brexit and 2016 U.S. elections. In this work we explore information
consumption on Twitter during the last European electoral campaign by analyzing the
interaction patterns of official news sources, fake news sources, politicians, people from
the showbiz and many others. We extensively explore interactions among different
classes of accounts in the months preceding the last European elections, held between
23rd and 26th of May, 2019. We collected almost 400,000 tweets posted by 863 accounts
having different roles in the public society. Through a thorough quantitative analysis we
investigate the information flow among them, also exploiting geolocalized information.
Accounts show the tendency to confine their interaction within the same class and the
debate rarely crosses national borders. Moreover, we do not find any evidence of an
organized network of accounts aimed at spreading disinformation. Instead,
disinformation outlets are largely ignored by the other actors and hence play a
peripheral role in online political discussions.
Introduction
The wide diffusion of online social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter raised
up concerns about the quality of the information accessed by users and about the way
in which users interact with each other [1–8]. Recently, the chairman of Twitter
announced that political advertisements will be banned from Twitter soon, claiming
that our democratic system could not be prepared to deal with the negative
consequences brought by the power and influence of online advertising campaigns1. In
this context, a wide body of scientific literature focused on the influence and on the
impact of disinformation and automation (i.e., social bots) on political elections [9–16].
In [9] the authors studied the impact of fake news on the 2016 US Presidential elections,
finding that user sensitivity to misinformation is linked to their political leaning. In [10]
is highlighted that fake news consumption is limited to a very small fraction of users
with well defined characteristics (middle aged, conservative leaning and strongly
1https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634360472829952
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engaged with political news). Authors of [11] studied the spreading of news on Twitter
in a 10 years time span and found that, although false news spread faster and broader
than true news, social bots boost false and true news diffusion at the same rate. The
pervasive role of social bots in the spread of disinformation was instead reported in [17]
for financial discussions, where as much as 71% of users discussing US stocks were found
to be bots. The effects of fake and unsubstantiated news affected also the outcome of
other important events at international level. For instance, the evolution of the Brexit
debate on Facebook has been addressed in [18] where evidence about the effects of echo
chamber, confirmation bias in news consumption and clustering are underlined.
Nevertheless, as stated in [19], the conclusions of these and other studies are partially
conflicting. This conflict can be the result of the differences in the definitions of fake
news or misinformation adopted by different authors, that have somewhat contributed
in switching the attention from the identification of fake news to the definition itself.
In particular, authors in [1] and [20] focused their attention on the process that can
boost the spreading of information over social media. In these works, it is highlighted
how phenomena such as selective exposure, confirmation bias and the presence of echo
chambers play a pivotal role in information diffusion and are able to shape the content
diet of users. Given the central role of echo chambers in the diffusion process, authors
of [21] propose a methodology based on users polarization for the early identification of
topics that could be used for creating misinformation. However, in [22] it is stressed
how the phenomenon of echo chambers can drive the spreading of misinformation and
that apparently there are no simple ways to limit this problem.
Considering the increasing attention paid to the influence of social media on the
evolution of the political debate, it becomes of primary interest to understand, at a fast
pace, how different actors participate in the online debate. Such concerns are renewed
in the view of the upcoming US Presidential Election of November 2020 or the future
national election in EU countries.
The goal of our work is to characterize the information flow among different actors
during the European Parliament elections held between the 23rd and 26th of May, 2019.
According to the European legislation, every 5 years all the countries members of EU
have to hold elections to renovate their members of the European Parliament. The
election can be held in a temporal window of few days and every state can decide in
which days to hold the voting procedure. In this context, we characterize the public
debate on Twitter in the months before the elections. In particular, we aim at
understanding which role was played by users that have different positions in public
society, including disinformation outlets and popular actors either directly or indirectly
related to politics, to obtain a wider view of the process. Through a thorough
quantitative analysis on a dataset of 399,982 tweets posted by 863 accounts in the three
months before the elections, we first analyze the information flow from a geographical
point of view and then we characterize the interactions among different classes of actors.
Finally, we compare the impact of disinformation-related accounts with respect to all
others. We find that all classes, except official news outlets, have a strong tendency
towards intra-class interaction and that the debate rarely cross the national borders.
Moreover, disinformation spreaders have a marginal role in the information exchange
and are ignored by other actors, despite their repeated attempts to join the
conversation. Although the maximum outreach of fake news accounts is lower than that
of other categories, when we take into account comparable levels of popularity we
observe an outreach for disinformation that is larger than that of traditional outlets and
comparable to that of politicians. Such evidence demonstrates that disinformation
outlets have a rather active followers base. However, the lack of interactions between
fake news accounts and others demonstrated that their user base is confined to a
peripheral portion of the network, suggesting that the countermeasures taken by
November 28, 2019 2/13
interactions
class users tweets retweets replies mentions articles
fake 45 24,331 4,375 2,640 12,927 4,389
official 333 207,171 49,515 9,966 99,595 48,095
politicians 328 88,627 23,188 5,603 57,512 2,324
showbiz 98 29,873 5,414 2,838 21,475 146
social media 8 8,824 402 3,901 4,499 22
sport 37 33,616 6,057 2,059 25,490 10
trademarks 6 4,289 207 1,789 2,293 0
VIPs 11 3,251 192 812 2,238 9
total 863 399,982 89,350 29,608 226,029 54,995
Table 1. Dataset summary.
Twitter, such as suspension or ban of suspicious accounts, were likely effective in
keeping the Twittersphere clean.
Results and Discussion
By exploiting Twitter APIs, we collected data from the Twitter timelines of 863 users.
This resulted in the acquisition of 399,982 tweets shared between February 28 and May
22, 2019. The 863 users in our dataset are classified into 8 categories, based on their
roles in the society. In detail, we have categories encompassing trusted news outlets
(labeled official), politicians, disinformation outlets (fake), show business
personalities (showbiz), official accounts of social media platforms, sport personalities,
famous brands (trademarks), and other VIPs. By leveraging information contained in
tweets and users metadata that we collected, we also computed the interactions between
all the accounts of our dataset and we geolocated Twitter users, whenever possible. A
detailed view of our Twitter dataset is summarized in Table 1 while additional
information is available in Section Materials and Methods.
By leveraging account interactions, we built a directed graph G = (V,E) where each
node vi ∈ V corresponds to a Twitter account and each link ei = (vA, vB) ∈ E from
node vA to node vB exists
(
i.e., A B
)
if and only if vA interacted with vB in one of
the following ways: (i) vA retweeted vB ; (ii) vA replied to vB ; (iii) vA mentioned
vB in a tweet; (iv) vA tweeted a link to an article that mentioned vB . We refer to
the last type of interaction as indirect – whereas all others are direct – since Web links
do not point directly to Twitter accounts, but rather point to Web pages outside
Twitter that, in turn, mention accounts in our dataset. Our rich interaction network is
thus representative of the information flow across different actors, including
disinformation outlets, and several countries involved in the last European elections.
We first characterize the geographical composition of our dataset. As shown in
Figure 1, our dataset is mainly made up of accounts located in EU and US. However, a
small fraction of accounts belong to other parts of the world. This is due to the fact that
we integrated our initial set of accounts with the most popular accounts that interacted
with them. Notice that only a small fraction of accounts belong to non EU-US places.
This may be a first signal that the interactions rarely cross national borders. Indeed,
the top panel of Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of user interactions on a
world map, while the bottom panel represents the information as a chord diagram where
interactions are grouped by actor class and by country. The top panel highlights that
the vast majority of interactions (65%) have as startpoint by official accounts (green
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Fig 1. Heatmap showing the distribution of users interacting with the different actor
classes, per geographic area.
links) and that a considerable number of links between US and EU (10%) exists. The
chord diagram of Figure 2 provides more details about countries and classes, confirming
that the biggest contribution to the debate is provided by official accounts, followed by
politicians. However, it is noticeable that most of the links start and end in the same
country, while the center of the chord diagram is almost empty, implying that the debate
rarely crossed national borders. The only relevant exception is represented by official
news outlets that tend to cite politicians from other countries (11% of all links). This is
particularly clear for the UK, where a relevant fraction of links coming from official
accounts points to accounts of US politicians (36% of all links from UK news outlets) –
that is, UK news outlets tweet about US politicians quite often. All other groups tends
to refer only to accounts from the same country and often also of the same type.
In order to understand how accounts of the same type interact among themselves,
we induced subgraphs based on node categories hence obtaining one subgraph for each
category. Figure 3 shows the subgraphs plotted in a world map, for the four biggest
classes of actors: fake (panel A), politicians (panel B), official (panel C), and showbiz
(panel D). We note that only subgraphs related to official news outlets, politicians and
showbiz accounts are well connected, indeed the proportion of nodes belonging to the
largest connected component is respectively 66%, 91% and 84% of the total number of
nodes. On the contrary, the graph related to disinformation news outlets (panel A)
comprises mostly isolated nodes. In the case of disinformation news outlets the nodes
belonging to the largest connected component are about 9% of the total number of
nodes. Such evidence suggests that Twitter accounts related to disinformation outlets
rarely dialogue with their peers, but rather they prefer to interact with other types of
actors. Furthermore, comparing Figure 3 with the chord diagram of Figure 2, we can
infer that outlets labelled as fake also display a tendency towards self-mentioning.
Instead, politicians and showbiz accounts show a relevant percentage of interactions
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Fig 2. Node-link diagram showing the geographic representation of information flows
(top) and Chord diagram showing class interactions grouped by country (bottom)
during EU elections. Loops are taken into account only in the chord diagram, that
highlights the tendency of accounts to interact mainly with users in the same nation
and often also in the same class.
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A B
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Fig 3. Geographic representation of intra-class interactions for the four biggest classes
of actors: fake (panel A), politicians (panel B), official (panel C), and showbiz (panel
D). Notably, panel A has only one link between two nodes in the UK, while all other
panels exhibit a large number of interactions. For clarity, self-loops are omitted.
with others from the same class (respectively 42% and 22%, without considering self
interactions) while official news outlets interacts mainly with other classes (71% of total
links amount). Although there are some similarities in the statistics of fake and official
outlets, that is, both try to interact with other classes, only official accounts catch the
attention of other actors, while fake outlets are most of the times ignored. To clarify the
Fig 4. Outgoing and incoming links by class. The top row accounts for all types of
interactions, the bottom one only considers direct interaction (i.e., replies, retweets,
mentions). For this analysis self-loops are considered, which explains the tendency of all
classes towards self-interaction.
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way in which different actors participated in the debate, we also analyzed the proportion
of incoming and outgoing links by class. Results are shown in Figure 4. In the first row
all types of interactions were considered (i.e., both direct and indirect), while in the
second one only direct interactions (retweets, replies, mentions) were taken into account.
Some differences arise when comparing all outgoing links with direct outgoing links
(left-hand side of Figure 4), in particular with regards to the classes fake and official.
When all kind of interactions (direct+indirect) are taken into account, we note an
increment in the fraction of outgoing links that points to politicians (blue-colored bar,
+57% and +51% respectively) for both classes. In other words, the classes labelled as
fake and official interact with politicians mainly through external resources.
The proportions of incoming links are shown in the right-hand side of Figure 4. The
most relevant difference between direct and indirect links concerns the category of
politicians. In fact, there is an increase of links coming from the official and fake classes
(+49% and +5%) that is in accordance with the differences found in the case of
outgoing links. Again, we notice that accounts, except for official ones, display the
tendency to interact mainly within their own classes, and this is even more evident
when only direct links are taken into account. Finally, by analyzing the behavior of the
official and fake classes, we noticed that both of them mainly refer to politicians when
external sources are taken into account. However, politicians mostly interact among
themselves and only a small fraction (9%) of their outgoing links are directed to official
accounts, with disinformation outlets being substantially ignored. Indeed, we measure
the number of nodes connected by reciprocal direct links (i.e. A and B are connected in
both direction with a link representing a mention, a retweet or a reply) among the
classes. We found that fake news accounts, news outlets and politicians reach
progressively higher reciprocity scores especially within their own classes. The average
percentage of nodes connected by reciprocated links in the same class is µ = 23.4% and
only 9% of fake news accounts are reciprocally interconnected. Moreover, fake news
accounts exhibit a behavior that differs from other classes when the percentage of nodes
connected by reciprocated inter-class links is taken into account: indeed, while the
average percentage is µ = 5.5%, fake news accounts do not display mutual connections
with any other class. Such evidence, combined with the information retrieved from
Figures 2 and 3, suggest that disinformation outlets try to fit in the political debate,
but they are essentially ignored by mainstream news sources, by politician, and also by
the other classes of actors.
Our previous finding indicates that Twitter accounts related to disinformation
outlets did not seem to be able to enter the main electoral debate. However, despite not
attracting interest from the main actors involved in the debate, they could still have had
an impact on the general audience. To investigate this issue we study the engagement,
computed as the number of retweets, generated by the different classes of actors. In
detail, Figure 5 compares the distribution of the engagement generated by all tweets of
disinformation outlets (grey-colored), with those generated by tweets of all the other
classes. Overall, Figure 5 shows that the engagement of disinformation outlets is
dominated by that of all other classes. In other words, tweets from accounts in the fake
class, manage to receive less retweets than those made by other accounts. To dig deeper
into this issue, we also considered the popularity, computed as the number of followers,
of the accounts belonging to the different classes of actors. In particular, we compared
the relation between account popularity and its mean engagement, for the different
classes of actors. Results are shown in Figure 6 by means of a bi-dimensional kernel
density estimation, for the 6 biggest classes of actors. When we consider also the
popularity of the accounts, an important feature of disinformation outlets emerges.
Indeed, for mid-low levels of popularity (number of followers ≤ 100, 000) accounts linked
to the spread of disinformation actually obtain more engagement than official news
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Fig 5. Distribution of the engagement obtained by tweets of disinformation outlets
(grey-colored) and comparison with the engagement obtained by tweets of all other
classes. Overall, disinformation outlets obtain less engagement than others.
outlets, and almost the same engagement obtained by politicians. This finding is also
shown in Figure 7, where popularity is logarithmically quantized into 7 buckets. This
important finding suggests that the audience of disinformation accounts is more active
and more prone to share contents, with respect to that of the other classes. Anyway, no
disinformation outlet currently reaches high levels of popularity (number of followers
≥ 1M), in contrast with all other classes of actors. As a consequence, highly popular
official news outlets still obtain more engagement than disinformation outlets. This
indicates that, although the audience of disinformation outlets is more prone to share
information than others, their influence on the public debate remains rather limited.
Additionally, even though disinformation accounts make efforts to attract interest of
other central users, they cannot really fit into the information flow in any significant
way.
Conclusions
We analyzed the interactions of several accounts belonging to different figures of the
public society in the context of the European elections. To have a wider view of the
phenomenon, we included in our dataset also personalities not directly related to
politics, such as show business and sport figures, together with a set of disinformation
outlets. We collected all the tweets made by the selected accounts in the three months
before the election days and we performed a quantitative analysis to identify the
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Fig 6. Kernel density estimation of engagement and popularity of the accounts
belonging to the main classes of actors. Despite obtaining overall less engagement,
disinformation outlets (grey-colored) actually obtain more engagement than official
news outlets (green-colored) at middle and low popularity levels.
Fig 7. Engagement obtained at different popularity levels by the different classes of
actors. Although disinformation outlets (labeled fake) do not reach high popularity
levels, they consistently obtain more engagement than official news outlets at middle
and low popularity levels, and comparable engagement with respect to politicians.
characteristics of the debate. By leveraging a semi-automated geolocalization technique,
we also performed a geographical analysis of the phenomenon. Results show that the
debate on Twitter rarely crossed national borders – that is, accounts tended to interact
mainly with others coming from the same nation. Moreover, there was a strong
tendency of intra-class interaction – that is, accounts mainly mentioned others from the
same class. The only relevant exception were accounts of official news outlets, especially
those located in United Kingdom, that had a non-negligible percentage of links pointing
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to the US. Moreover, it is interesting that disinformation outlets did not interact among
themselves, but rather they exhibited a tendency towards self-mentions and they tried
to catch the attention of other popular accounts. Nevertheless, differently from official
news outlets, disinformation outlets were almost completely ignored by others, thus
occupying a peripheral position in the interaction network and having a limited
influence on the information flow. Still, they exhibited an outreach on general public
higher than official news outlet and comparable with the politicians at the same levels
of popularity, thus implying that the user base of disinformation outlets was more active
than that of other classes of actors. However, all other categories overcame
disinformation outlets in terms of absolute maximum outreach, thanks to their
significantly larger absolute popularity. Finally, the limited and bounded contribution
that disinformation outlets had on the overall interactions may suggest that the
strategies employed by Twitter to counteract the spreading of disinformation – that is,
the ban or suspension of suspicious accounts – are indeed effective and can help to
preserve the integrity of the Twittersphere.
Materials and Methods
Data Collection
Our dataset is based on a list of 863 Twitter accounts, split across 8 categories and 18
countries. The list can be found here:
https://github.com/cinhelli/Limited-Reach-Fake-News-Twitter-2019-EU-Elections.
Initially, the countries considered in this study were the 5 biggest European countries
(UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain) and the US, then others were added when we
extended the dataset to popular users which interacted with someone from our initial
set.
The first category of accounts (labeled fake) is related to known disinformation
outlets. It contains 49 Twitter accounts responsible for sharing disinformation,
identified in authoritative reports – such as Reuters’ Digital News Report 20182 and a
report from the European Journalism Observatory3 – and fact-checking Web sites –
such as Snopes4 and Politifact5. Our list of official news outlets (labeled official)
contains 347 Twitter accounts. It includes accounts corresponding to the main news
outlets in each of the considered countries, derived from the media list released by the
European Media Monitor6, as well as the Twitter accounts of the main US news outlets.
We then considered a list of 349 politicians (labeled politicians). This list includes all
available Twitter accounts of the members of the European parliament7 as of March
2019, as well as the main politicians for each considered country that did not belong to
the European parliament.
We firstly exploited Twitter APIs to crawl the timelines of all the accounts
belonging to the 3 previous lists. In order to match the electoral period, we only
retained tweets shared between February 28 and May 22, 2019. After this step, we also
manually classified a small subset of the most popular accounts that interacted with
those of our initial lists in the considered time period. These accounts were classified in
5 additional categories, based on their role in the society. In this way, we obtained
additional 100 showbiz accounts (e.g., actors, tv hosts, singers), 10 social media
accounts (e.g., Youtube’s official account), 37 sport accounts (e.g., sport players and
2https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/our-research/measuring-reach-fake-news-and-online-disinformation-europe
3https://en.ejo.ch/
4https://www.snopes.com/
5https://www.politifact.com/
6https://emm.newsbrief.eu/overview.html
7http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/home
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the official accounts of renown sport teams), 6 trademarks accounts related to famous
brands (e.g., Nike, Adidas) and 11 accounts of VIPs (e.g., the Pope, Elon Musk, J.K.
Rowling). For each of these additional accounts, we crawled the respective timeline and
only retained tweets shared in our considered time period.
After this data collection process, we ended up with the dataset summarized in
Table 1, comprising more than 850 labeled accounts and almost 400,000 tweets.
Account interactions
For each account, we also computed its interactions with other accounts. In particular,
we split interactions into 4 different categories: retweets, replies, mentions, and article
mentions.
The first 3 types of interactions are straightforward, while an article mention is
detected when an account shares a tweet containing a URL to a Web page that
mentions one of the labeled accounts in our dataset. To obtain information about
article mentions we scraped all the Web pages linked within the tweets of our dataset.
Within each page, we performed language detection and named entity recognition.
Finally, we cross-checked person named entities with our lists of users.
Account geolocation
Whenever possible, we also exploited the location field of Twitter accounts (both the 863
labeled ones, as well as all others with which they interacted) in order to geolocate them.
For this process, we exploited several different geolocators (e.g., Google Maps, Bing,
GeoNames) that offer their services via Web APIs. We first selected all accounts with a
non-empty location field. Then, we built a blacklist for discarding those locations that
were too vague or clearly ironic (e.g., global, worldwide, Mars, the internet), as is
frequently the case with user-generated input. For each distinct location that was not
removed during the filtering step, we queried one of the available geolocators and we
associated the corresponding geographic coordinates to all accounts with that location.
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